Merited irrationality and intellectual metaethics:

We should reject an old philosophical idea: that the good life is an epistemically rational life. In this context, I defend pluralism about doxastic evaluation: epistemic evaluation is just one among several forms of doxastic or intellectual evaluation, and has no pride of place among them. In defense of this, I challenge standard accounts of the aim of belief.

The Aims of Cognition and Conation

Wishful Thinking as Responding to Non-Epistemic Theoretical Reasons

What's So Bad About Bad Faith? (with Simon Feldman)

Other works in progress:

Color Physicalism and Color Projectivism (with Edward Averill)

Amoralism and Aesthetic Apathy

Faith and Liberalism

How the Present Depends on the Future

A Defence of Vaguely Restricted Composition

Papers that are forthcoming:

Brutal Individuation, in New Waves in Metaphysics (Palgrave-Macmillan)

A Problem for Relational Theories of Color (with Edward Averill), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

The Myth of Factive Verbs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research; winner of the 2007 Young Epistemologist Prize

How to Defend Response Moralism, British Journal of Aesthetics 49:3 (2009)

Papers that are out:

"Knowledge and Conversation," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79:1 (2009), pp. 591-620

"Grice's Razor," Metaphilosophy 37:5 (2007), pp. 669-690

"Disassembly and Destruction," The Monist 89:3 (2006), pp. 418-33

"Epistemic Conceptions of Begging the Question," Erkenntnis 65:3 (2006), pp. 343-63

"How to Defeat Belief in the External World," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87:2 (2006), pp. 198-212

"Possible Evils," Ratio 19:2 (2006), pp. 191-8