How to Defend Response Moralism - Response moralism is the idea that a person can be morally evaluated based on her emotional responses to a fiction, i.e. that some emotional responses to fictions are morally right, and others morally wrong. This essay aims to develop a satisfactory defence of this view. In §1 I present a challenge for response moralism. In §2 I discuss several responses to the challenge, and find them lacking. In §3 I defend a response to the challenge, based on the idea that our emotional responses to fictions are often responses to real events and people.

Faith and Liberalism - I criticize "Uniqueness": the thesis that, given a body of evidence, there is only one reasonable doxastic attitude to take towards any proposition. This critique is based on a defense of "groundless foundationalism", according to which certain of our beliefs are reasonable, independent of any evidential support they may or may not enjoy, given their role as principles of evidence.

A Problem for Physicalist Accounts of Color (with Edward Averill) - We offer a criticism of color physicalism: the view is forced to maintain that looking red is identical to looking R, where R is the physical property (e.g. spectral reflectance type) that is identical to redness (according to physicalism). But this is a false claim about the phemomenology of color experience.

Is Knowledge Something Everyone Wants? - I consider two plausible versions, and one false version, of Aristotle's maxim that everyone naturally wants knowledge.

What Do We Mean When We Call a Fiction 'Unrealistic'? - I consider two possible answers: the first characterizes the unrealistic in terms of depicting the unlikely, the second characterizes it in terms of implying something false. And the .pdf contains a wonderful picture of John McClane jumping off an airplane in Live Free or Die Hard.

How the Present Depends on the Future - I argue that 'anti-realism about the future' (the view that there are presently no truths about the future) isn't common sense, because common sense is committed to cases in which the present depends on the future.

Why Everything is Going to be OK - A defense of epistemically irrational optimism, and the view that comedies teach optimism, in something like the same way that Martha Nussbaum says tragedies teach us that happiness is fragile.

Epistemic Consequentialism and Hinge Propositions - I reply to Anthony Bruckener's proposed counterexample ("Hinge Propositions and Epistemic Justification," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2007) to my argument for 'groundless foundationalism' in "How to Defeat Belief in the External World."

What's Bad about Bad Faith? (with Simon Feldman) - We consider four accounts of bad faith (or "inauthenticity"), challenge the view that authenticity is a "higher and better form of life" than being in bad faith, and express sympathy for a conception of bad faith as lying to others.

A Defence of Vaguely Restricted Composition - I criticize the argument from vagueness (advanced by Lewis and Sider) against restricted composition, defending the thesis that the idioms of quantification are vague.

Color Dualism - I defend the idea that colors are not real, but mere powers of objects to produce experiences in observers, on the grounds that there are two kinds of color properties. An ecumenical account of debates over color in the contemporary literature is advanced.